2: Hudson E-4, 5 (1938) 1938 BQ2 Kazak BQ2

KAZAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

IN this paper I have attempted to explain the nature of certain features of Turco-Mongol social structure by an examination of some of the processes which appear to have been active in their development. The study is based on information gathered during field work among the Kazak from July to October 1936.[1] Most of the material, unless otherwise indicated, relates to the middle of the nineteenth century, to the period immediately preceding the Russian conquest of Central Asia.

The Kazak,[2] frequently referred to in the older ethnographic literature as Kirghiz, were until very recently a nomadic stock breeding people but are now rapidly adopting a sedentary life. They inhabit the steppe country between, roughly, the Caspian Sea and the Altai Mountains and number, according to the census of 1926, 3,959,000. Traditionally they were divided into three "hordes" or ordas: the Great Orda in the east and the Little Orda in the west, with the Middle Orda between them. They speak a Turkic language which is classed by Deny[3] with Kirghiz and Bashkir as a "western dialect." The Kazak are definitely Mongoloid in physical appearance with evidence of considerable Caucasoid admixture among the southern and western groups. Basic Kazak culture, which has been summarized by Murdock[4] is closely related in nearly every aspect with that of the Kirghiz, Turcoman, Kalmyk, and Mongols. Historically the Kazak can be first dated as a distinct people in 1465[5] although the names of some of their constituent groups may be traced much farther back.[6] They were gradually conquered by the Russians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and now form a republic of the Soviet Union.

Although the literature on the Kazak is large the details of their social organization have remained obscure. They are usually described as divided into a large number of tribes, subtribes, gentes and "branches" whose structure, function and relation to one another are not clear. In this study I have sought to define the nature of Kazak social groupings, the process of their origin and their relation to economic life, marriage and the family, class stratification, and political administration.

[1] Field work was made possible financially by a University Fellowship from the Yale Graduate School and a grant from the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University.

[2] The present official Russian form of the name, transliterated, is Kazakh. This was adopted in order to avoid confusion with Cossack, which is also Kazak in Russian. In Kazak orthography the name is Qazaq but I have used the more familiar form.

[3] Deny, *Les Langues turques*, 202.

[4] Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, 135–62.

[5] Muhammad Haidar, *The Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, 82.

[6] Kuftin, *Kirgiz-Kazaki*, 8.

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121 To give perspective in time and space to the Kazak material I have indicated the possible
127 course of development of comparable social institutions among the Mongol tribes. In so doing I have relied chiefly on the work of Vladimirtsov.[7]

From the Kazak and Mongol material, supplemented by information from other groups, it has seemed permissable in conclusion to postulate certain general tendencies which appear to have been active in the formation of Turco-Mongol social structure. It must be emphasized, however, that the interpretations which I have ventured to make are to be considered only as a working hypothesis based on inadequate and incomplete material whose value must be tested by future investigations. More new problems have arisen than there have been solutions found to old ones.

000 Among those in America to whom special acknowledgements are due are my teachers, Dr. Edward Sapir and Dr. Leslie Spier, for aid and encouragement over many years. I am grateful to Professor George Vernadsky for numerous helpful suggestions. My obligations to friends in the Soviet Union are many. I am particularly indebted to the administrations of the Institute of Anthropology, Ethnography and Archaeology of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in Leningrad, and of the Kazakstan Base of the Academy of Sciences in Alma-ata. It would be presumptuous to thank Elizabeth E. Bacon who has shared the field work, research and writing.

115 Field work was considerably hampered by police regulation of the movement of foreigners in Kazakstan which restricted me to the town of Alma-ata and its immediate vicinity. Most of the information came from two informants: Umurzaq Kargabaiev and Nurqumandur Tlenshiev.[8] The former was a man 75 years of age living on the Kalinin Kolkhoz, a collective cattle farm about twenty kilometers from Alma-ata, which occupied part of the land formerly used by Kargabaiev's tribe of the Great Orda. He was well known in the Alma-ata district as a poet and musician and for his knowledge of Kazak traditions, genealogies and epics. He spoke only Kazak. Tlenshiev, 23 years old, came from a branch of the Little Orda in the southern Urals and was a student at the Pedagogical Institute in Alma-ata. His knowledge of Kazak culture was extensive but as regards the former social organization, mostly second-hand. He naturally evaluated old Kazak life in terms of the Marxist philosophy in which he had been educated so that his information must be weighed accordingly. He spoke Russian and acted as interpreter for me with Kargabaiev.[9] There were numerous other occasional informants, members of the Kalinin Kolkhoz and students of the Pedagogical Institute who took part in discussions as they happened to be present. In a somewhat different category was Professor S. J. Asfendiarov, president of the Kazakstan Base of the USSR Academy of Sciences and author of a history of Kazakstan. Although a

[7] Vladimirtsov, *Obshchestvennyi Stroĭ*.

[55] [8] The second names are really patronymics used as family names with the Russian termination. Thus Tlenshiev's father was named Tlenshi.

[9] The fact that discussions had to be carried on in a language in which neither the interpreter nor the ethnographer was particularly proficient is regrettably but unavoidably reflected in the quality and quantity of some of the information.

/i/The study of the modern juridical life of the Kazakhs and Kirgiz is extremely important, both for the proper organization of the administration and the courts in the midst of the nomadic population of our Central Asian regions, and equally for science. 121

The need has long been felt for a study of the customary law of the non-Russians inhabiting the borderlands of the empire. Thus in the 1820s a collection of the customary law of the Siberian indigenous peoples, including the Kazakhs, was made by order of the government, under the supervision of the Governor-General of Siberia and a special commission. The collection was made by the peoples themselves, in their languages and was preserved in Russian translation in the second section of the chancellery belonging to His Own Imperial Majesty. Count Speranskii had the idea of compiling a code of all the local laws and customs in the empire, incidentally also for the Siberian indigenous peoples, and for this code the collection mentioned above could have served as material. But this idea was never carried out, and the material collected in Siberia was published only in 1876 from the copies preserved, by Professor D. Ia. Samokvasov of Warsaw University, under the title Sbornik Obychnago Prava Sibirskikh Inorodtsev / A Collection of the Customary Law of the Siberian Indigenous Peoples. At the end of this collection, in the section of Kazakh customs, there is an account of the customary law of the Kazakhs in a strictly dogmatic form, obviously of the Siberian department, i. e., primarily of the Great and Middle Hordes. There is no mention of the Kirgiz in the collection. 114

As can be seen from the foreword to the section on the customs of the Kazakhs, this material was compiled in a special committee with the participation of Kazakh elders. Even from a cursory reading of this section it is evident that the material of the committee was composed to a considerable degree by Kazakhs invited into the committee. Such is the chapter "On religious worship."(1)

1. For example, article 7 reads "Whoever converts a Christian to the Kazakh religion, that person will be included with the faithful in the kingdom of heaven." While article 8 says: "If a member of a Kazakh tribe accepts the Christian faith, not only will he lose his rights of succession to his own property, but if one of them who has the express purpose of being converted

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[178] demands to which the tenets of customary law have also been having to adapt themselves.

In 1884 I turned to the officials of the uyezd administration with the request for a collection of cusomary laws. But the material they sent, collected by illiterate translators, was of no value.

121 In January 1886 I made the acquaintance of A. N. Vyshnegorskii, who was a graduate of the Historical Philosophical Institute. While in service in Central Asia he had learned the Kazakh, Sart and Persian languages. At once it came to my mind to invite him to collect on the spot, in the actual nomadic camps and winter camps of the Kazakhs, by means of interroagation and transcription of the words of the biis and other well-informed persons.

In order to begin action, I turned to the well-known specialist in Central Asia, V. P. Nalivkin, requesting him to draw up a program for the collection of the tenets of Kazakh customary law. Mr. Nalivkin complied with my request, and in the beginning of 1886 Mr. Vyshne-
124 gorskii was sent into the area. He was told, among other things, to write down all the variants of the customary laws according to localities, and the names of his informants, and not to neglect any evidence, no matter how unimportant it seemed. Mr. Vyshnegorskii spent seven months among the nomads and collected so much material that it took about a year to analyze it. In addition there were dealings with the areas to fill in gaps or to explain places which were unclear. On various cases
128 judgments were taken from the biis' books for illustration of the material collected.

In this manner the present tome was compiled, comprising a code of the modern juridical customs of the Kazakhs of the Syr-Darya region.

In addition to the material of purely juridical character, historical narratives were collected from copies of ancient manuscripts preserved by literate Kazakhs, as well as heroic poems, superstitions, fables, riddles, charms and others. There is probably enough of this material for two more volumes. In view of this /vi/ the plan for the entire edition has been considerably expanded and been given a more general title: the Kazakhs and Kirgiz of the Syr-Darya region.

115 In the collection of the customary laws the most valuable data were furnished by the following:1)E. A. Aleksandrov, assistant to the chief of the Kazalinsk uyezd, by birth a Siberian Kazakh from the Kokchetav mountains, who has a good knowledge of the Kazakh language and is acquainted with the everyday life of the Kazakhs.

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Part II. Ideas on the History of the Present-day Kirghiz-Kazaks.

Chapter 3. On the Origin of the Kirghiz-Kazaks and their Condition until their Submission to Russia in 1730.

121 The lack of authentic documents on the basis of which to write a history of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, the impossibility of taking advantage of their traditions, and our determination not to make suppositions which are pure guesses would leave us with nothing positive to say to our readers on the origin of this people if our honored orientalist, Mr. Senkovsky, had not been kind enough to give us help. Having profited from his works and his knowledge of the history of the Orient, we will complete here the account of what we know about the Kirghiz-Kazaks by glancing at their history, from their origin to the time when they began to appear in Russian chronicles, that is, until the middle of the 16th century.

173 175 For the last hundred years most Russians have believed and written that the first Kazaks sprang from the Tatars, or took form among them, and that the name Kazak arose among them, whence it was extended to all the Kazaks [136] of former times and to those who exist today. However, specialists in Oriental history are firmly refuting this opinion to which one is so accustomed in Russia and which has given rise to so many debates among the scholars there. These specialists affirm that the Kazaks formed an independent and compact nation in the earliest centuries of our era, and some even trace their existence back to a period well before the birth of Christ. It is certain that Firdevsi (or [114] Ferdussi), who lived in 1020, that is, two centuries before the Mongols appeared in the west, spoke in his history of Rurtam of a Kazak people and Kazak khans. His work and the most ancient [101 721] Persian chronicles upon which he has drawn inform us that the ancient Kazaks, like those of today, made themselves famous by plundering and raiding and that their principal weapon was the

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

INTRODUCTION[1]

Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, extends from the Caspian Sea to the Sino-Soviet frontier of Sinkiang, including within its borders an environment ranging from arid deserts to fertile mountain valleys. It covers an area of more than one million square miles—about four times that of Texas. It is the second largest unit in the Soviet Union, immediately following the Russian republic.

Size is not the only impressive feature of Kazakhstan. Budgetwise the republic ranks third among the 16 republics of the USSR, after Russia and Ukraine, and ahead of several considerably more populous administrative units. Its importance for Soviet production was enhanced by the industrial developments of World War II. The mining and industrial concentrations of Karaganda and of the eastern part of Kazakhstan lie about midway between the western boundaries of the Soviet satellite empire and the Siberian shores of the Pacific. Postwar planning clearly reflects the Soviet estimate of the potentialities of the area's natural resources in the effort to create in Central Asia a "freedom-loving peoples' arsenal for peace."

The Soviet Central Asian basin is separated from the non-Soviet world by high mountain chains and deserts. The Turkic peoples of the USSR, who number about 15 million and thus form the largest non-Slavic minority in the Soviet Union, have lived in and traveled about this area for centuries. The Kazakhs and the other Turkic groups share many similarities in language and in culture. They also experience in common a conflict between their traditional way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Central Communist regime, a conflict as acute as that experienced by any of the other minority peoples.

The present study of the Kazakh way of life was undertaken in an endeavor to determine the nature and source of these conflicts, and to examine the problems created thereby for Moscow. In addition, the report sets forth information gathered concerning the communication patterns and facilities of the republic insofar as these are relevant to the possible needs of psychological warfare.

This section summarizes those aspects of the deep-seated differences between the Soviet and native Kazakh cultures which can most

[1]Part I was written by Thomas Gladwin, Human Resources Research Office, and Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

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121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

181 221 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the most acute problems—problems which became disastrous for the Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations [433] the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose [621] members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men. Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrading. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was performed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in [462] [564] Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor. [567]

The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resistance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and 649 197 their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939 amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal [161] increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

The fact that positions of responsibility are filled by Slavs means that they are almost the only ones in Kazakhstan to be seen enjoying the material rewards so conspicuously granted to members of the Soviet elites. Regardless of whose fault this may be, it must at times breed resentment among the Kazakhs. Similarly, the preponderance of Slavs in higher governmental, Party, executive, and judicial positions means that the Kazakhs are almost never governed, judged, or defended by their fellows. It must often happen that Kazakhs who feel they are the victims of injustice identify this as discrimination.

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NATIONALITY POLICY

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Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities within the USSR has also created a long-standing dilemma in the case of the Kazakhs—a dilemma which appears to provide an important vulnerability for psychological warfare exploitation. This policy strives to create national political units which are "socialist in content, national in form." This means in effect that the political structure and economy of the various national groups are organized along standard Soviet lines and their energies are directed toward Soviet objectives, but the symbols of nationality (particularly the local languages) are retained to grant a sense of continuity with past traditions. The devising and implementing of this policy was the earliest responsibility assumed by Stalin under Lenin's guidance. It has had varying degrees of success in different areas, but in the balance has proved to be a very useful tool of Soviet administration.

The Kazakhs, however, are a people still too deeply attached to their old life and its traditions and values to accept mere lip service to their national heritage. Every time an effort has been made to raise Kazakh morale and productivity by permitting public attention to national heroes and literature, the result has been an enthusiasm the Soviets have viewed as threatening. This was particularly true when, during World War II, national patriotism was extensively exploited throughout the USSR to inspire the people to defend their homeland. Among the Kazakhs this developed into a cult glorifying their native herbes and culture, a phenomenon which had also appeared during the 1920's and had grown until it became such a threat that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviets. After the war Kazakh nationalism, left unsuppressed, continued to grow in strength until finally in the 1950's a purge was required to check its growing force.

K [186] [668]

It seems certain that these sentiments will lie for a long time close beneath the surface, available for mobilization through psychological warfare, regardless of the turns Soviet nationality policy might take in the event of another war. For this reason, considerable attention has been devoted in this report to Kazakh history, including its national heroes, and to Kazakh cultural values and traditions.

K 121

One method which the Soviets employ to make the minority republics "national in form" is the utilization wherever possible of native Communists to fill positions in the local Party and government. As might be expected, in the Kazakh SSR there is a chronic shortage of

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KN 563 665 Kazakhs who are tried-and-true Communists. Moscow, however, repeatedly criticizes the local Party for the small proportion of natives in positions of administrative responsibility. One result of this pressure is that the Party is forced to accept into its own ranks and those of government and industry marginally reliable persons who, if put to the test, would very possibly prove more loyal to their Kazakh nationality than to their Soviet citizenship. These marginal people—Kazakh and Communist at the same time—deserve particular attention as targets for psychological warfare, because of their psychological vulnerability and also their crucial position as mediators between two cultures. K [121]

RELIGION

KN 798 The religion of the Kazakhs provides the Soviets with yet another problem of policy, at both the local and the Moscow level. Totalitarian governments in general seem to view religion as a threat which must be either neutralized or made captive to serve their own ends. The Communists are no exception. In the Soviet Union they have developed an approach to each of the major organized religions, which has proved more or less successful in attaining these ends.

Most of the Turkic peoples of Soviet Central Asia are thoroughgoing and conservative Moslems. Toward them the Soviets have adopted the familiar procedures of installing puppet leaders and attacking those aspects of the religion which they view as potentially dangerous. But their established techniques and procedures fail to fit the Kazakh pattern. The Moslem religion has had some influence on the Kazakhs, but the aspects of Islam which they have adopted are largely superficial in nature; they still believe in what is essentially a folk religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. During the Tsarist era this fact was apparently never clearly recognized. One assumes that the Communists know better, but their knowledge evidently has not equipped them to deal adequately with the unusual religious blend of Kazakh beliefs and practices. Also, because Kazakh religion is largely local in nature, it has no strong "commanding heights" of organization which can be subverted in order to deliver believers to Communist control. K [111]

As a result of this dilemma, most Kazakhs have been singularly free of attack on religious grounds. Actually, since the Soviets are forced for lack of a better designation to treat the Kazakhs administratively as Moslems, they are in effect in the paradoxical position of encouraging rather than discouraging the Islamic aspect of Kazakh religion. However, although continuing contact with Uzbeks in Southern Kazakhstan has increased the strength of the Moslem religion among some Kazakhs, the old folk religion has retained much of its strength and integrity, and it promises to remain for many years another bulwark of the traditional Kazakh way of life. K [111]

K 121 This summary has stressed those aspects of Kazakh culture and recent history most likely to be of pertinent use in planning divisive psychological warfare intended to deflect Kazakh energies away from the objectives of the Soviet regime. The manner of future psychological

warfare exploitation of Kazakh vulnerabilities must depend upon an evaluation of conditions current at the time. However, it seems fairly certain that these vulnerabilities will center primarily about resistance to collectivization, Kazakh loyalties to their own nationality and culture, the strength of Kazakh ties to their kinsmen, and the persistence of their folk religion. 121

RESEARCH METHOD

The Kazakhs were selected as the subjects for this study because the great loss in Kazakh population in the 1930's suggested serious difficulties between them and the Soviets, and also because Kazakhstan is one of the more inaccessible and little known areas of the Soviet Union. Consequently, particular attention has been given to the analysis of demographic data in an attempt to define more exactly the extent and the causes of the population loss. At the same time, every effort has been made to develop techniques for exploiting all possible sources of information in order to provide a methodology applicable to the study of other inaccessible areas. 127

The report relies heavily on the use of local Kazakhstan newspapers, in addition to normally available sources of information. The local materials of the region have been systematically searched, and the analysis of their contents has permitted the composition of a picture of Kazakh life which could be constructed by no other means. Use of local sources of information was first regarded as only one of several research techniques; in the course of the project it developed into a systematic and productive methodology to depict the fabric of life of a region to which we have no direct access—a methodology not limited in its usefulness to the study of Kazakhstan. These day-to-day problems of life under the Soviets are not revealed in the more general sources of information emanating from the USSR, such as the Moscow press and radio. The local press, on the contrary, supplies detailed data on the relations between the ethnic minorities and the central regime in Moscow; it provides a gauge of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy, and points to trouble spots in the political structure, in education, and in cultural affairs.

Soviet border as a sieve; it is not, and at present movement out of Soviet Central Asia to the surrounding countries is difficult. But it is not impossible. Archeologists in northern Iran have reported the presence of individuals who were obviously natives of Central Asia but plainly not of local origin. It was explained to one of the archeologists that these newcomers were on a pilgrimage to Mecca.

In recent years articles have referred to a flow in the opposite direction. The Ismaelian sect of Islam has had a strong and faithful following among the tribes of the Pamir Mountains for many centuries. Collectors of tribute in postwar years have appeared in southern Tadzhikistan to collect the age-old due, and this practice has been the subject of complaint in the local newspapers.

On a broader scale, there have been flights from the Soviet Union into all the surrounding countries. During the 1930's, over 30,000 Kazakhs appeared in Outer Mongolia, a region in which few Kazakhs previously had lived. There they remain to this day. Untold numbers of Kazakhs fled across to Sinkiang; some made a second trek, from Sinkiang to Kashmir, when the agents of Mao Tse-tung appeared in the Chinese province.

Thousands have migrated from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan, their number increasing steadily from the 1920's through the 1940's. The Afghan government at first announced a protective policy toward these migrants, but this policy was never put into practice and recently it has been officially revoked. As a result the people suffer as much outside the Soviet Union as they had within; there is much unrest, and many return to the USSR. Suffering and unrest are evident in Iran as well, although the flow has not been as noticeable there; strangers lose themselves more easily in Iran than in Afghanistan.

Here is a vast field for fruitful work. These migrant peoples are potential sources of information; they are channels of communication into and out of the Soviet Union. Extensive interviewing and survey work among these groups could reap rich rewards.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

systematic, and subject to a number of qualifications. What data there are, however, suggest that among the people of Kazakhstan Russians marry Russians and Turks marry Turks. Again it appears that the Kazakhs do not wish to mingle with the Russians, just as, in the political domain, they do not join the Party nor engage in other political activities with the Russians. In general, on the basis of what direct evidence there is, this attitude may be summed up as noncompliance, or a kind of passive resistance. Corroborative data are seen in the economic domain, where the Kazakhs are not fulfilling plans.

THE SOVIET THEORY OF CULTURAL CHANGE

The theory of acculturation in anthropology has been devised to describe the social process which occurs when two different cultures come into close contact with each other. This theory has arisen out of the reflections of western European and American ethnologists on contact between their own culture and others. But there is in western civilization no general theory of culture which deals with total control of the social relations and direction of change resulting from such contact. The Russian policy toward minorities within the Soviet Union is nothing other than a theory of controlled acculturation. In their theory of history and in the formulation of their minority policy the Soviet theoreticians have proclaimed a method whereby they—and they alone—are able to control the processes of social development. They boast control over the direction in which the different peoples of the Soviet Union will change; they claim the power to dictate the manner of the change and the form that the ultimate society will take.

Starting out as a society of pastoral nomads in which membership was based on paternal kinship traced from a common male ancestor (a society also divided into aristocrats and commoners), the Kazakhs joined—or rather, were drafted into—the Soviet world. The Soviet ethnographers depict the Kazakh society as an amalgam of institutions surviving from the past, coupled with Soviet features such as collective farm organization, Party membership, and government by soviets. The survivals include the family as the unit of production and consumption, and the traditional village organization, upon which the collective farm has been superimposed. Another survival is nepotism, which is ever present in Kazakh political life. A society steeped in traditions of kinship thinks of kinship as the means for social cooperation; hence, nepotism is inherent in the very nature of Kazakh society and inevitably finds its way into the political life. But it is incompatible with the Soviet pattern and it is attacked as such.

Soviet criticism of these features, and the constant drive to eradicate them, are essential elements in the theory of controlled social and cultural change. This change originating in the contact between the Russian and the Kazakh cultures becomes a part of the general pattern of controlled acculturation. This, however, is only the theory.

In reality there is little evidence that the grand plan for social change is being carried out, or even that there is a means for carrying

of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[1] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[2]

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century.

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia.

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[3] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it

[1] Syria (83), 23 Jun 42; *L'Oriente Moderno* (37), 1942, p. 372.
[2] Izvestiya (11), 1952.
[3] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

121 668 and seeking a revival of their own native culture. They frequently do this by attributing a mystical power to their aboriginal culture and selecting from it elements to serve as a source of strength in their present battle with the western world. These elements then become combined with features of western culture. The general term nativism has been used to describe this pattern of cultural development. The concept is applicable to many contemporary situations; the Celtic revival in Wales and Ireland may be regarded as a revivalistic form of nativism, and certain elements in the foundation of the state of Israel belong under the same heading.

Although the symbols and professed aims of nativistic movements are cultural and political in nature, their primary motivating force is essentially religious. Despite their frequent lack of purposeful organization, nativistic movements can have great strength; they are born of desperation and fed by a fervor much like that which characterizes messianic religions. Frequently, in fact, the leaders become in effect messiahs; in other cases the revered figures of the movement are heroes of the past.

668 Nativism among the Kazakhs has followed the latter course, focusing on the mythical ancestors and later heroes of Kazakh history. During the period 1916-1922, a nativistic political movement arose in what is today Kazakhstan (at that time Kirgizia). This movement—the Alash-Orda—was not a political party in the strict sense of the term, although it undertook a broad range of political activities, within the European frame of meaning; it supplied a leadership and ideology to a movement seeking the cultural as well as the political unification of the Kazakh nomads. The general chaos on the steppes of Asia after the collapse of Tsarism and before the solidification of the Soviet rule provided the opportunity for such a movement. In those years, the nascent era of the Soviet regime, Moscow was involved in revolution and civil war, and had little time or manpower to spare for the integration of Central Asia into Bolshevik-Leninism. In fact, Moscow reacted in a vaguely friendly way to the Alash-Orda since it too was antagonistic to Tsarism. For a brief moment, it appeared to the members of the Kazakh political movement that Moscow would supply the means for the liberation of the Kazakhs.

The Alash-Orda had no specific political program other than urging itself as the representative of the Kazakh people. It made no real effort toward political separatism from the Russian regime; possibly it felt that this would come naturally, or that the time was not yet ripe and the leaders themselves not far enough advanced politically to call for such a move. The general slogan, the name Alash-Orda, under which these Kazakh leaders and intellectuals sought to unify their people, reflects their desire for unity as a people.

The Orda is the horde, the broad organizational unit of Kazakh society, which in recent centuries had known no unity, but only a division into three and later four separate hordes. The name represents the revival of a social and political organization from the distant past of the Kazakhs. Even the smaller hordes had but little meaning for the Kazakhs after the middle of the 19th century. And the unification of all

Chapter 8

COMMUNICATION

121 One of the assumptions on which this study is based is that the Kazakhs of Soviet Central Asia are a potentially receptive audience for American psychological warfare. Information gained from the study would seem to support this assumption. Such information could be used to infer psychological vulnerability areas of the target population. But one can do little in the area of vulnerability content—vulnerable to what, under what conditions?—without knowledge of the communication process as it takes place within the target population. In practical terms, before determining what is to be said, the problem of how and through what channel it is to be said in order to reach the given target should be considered.

For this reason, a general discussion of communication conditions in Soviet Central Asia seems appropriate.

LINGUISTIC CONDITIONS[1]

197 The languages of Turkestan may be divided into three general groups: Turkic, Slavic (e.g., Russian, Ukrainian), and Iranian (e.g., Tadzhik).

Since the Kazakhs are a Turkic people, attention will be focused on this group. The major Turkic-speaking peoples are (1) the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Karakalpaks, (2) the Uzbeks, and (3) the Turkmen. Uzbek and Turkmen are definitely separate languages, but those of the "three K's" are so similar in their spoken form that they may be viewed as dialects of one language. The following comparisons may benefit readers more familiar with European languages: The relationship between Kazakh and Kirgiz or between Kazakh and Karakalpak is roughly similar to that between the Czech and Slovak languages, or between the Danish and Norwegian.

In geographic areas where related languages have existed side by side, transitional strips may be found where the dialect spoken by the population has been clearly influenced by the language of their neighbors. The chief difference between the speech of the Karakalpaks and that of the Kazakhs, for example, is that the former language replaces initial "t" by "d" and "k" by "g". This feature is characteristic of Turkmen,

115 [1]Much of the material on linguistic conditions is based on a discussion with Dr. N. N. Poppe of the University of Washington.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

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The western observer should keep in mind the following considerations when evaluating contemporary technological conditions in Central Asia:

(1) However backward conditions may seem to the outsider, to the native observer—who possesses no foreign yardstick—the situation appears far advanced over the past. Indeed, local conditions may be greatly superior technologically to neighboring, more primitive republics and countries (Sinkiang, for example).

(2) Although the normal process of cultural diffusion, accelerated by the introduction of mass communication media, results in some technological progress in backward areas (even against strong local opposition), this progress does not necessarily go hand in hand with social advances; it may in some cases be detrimental to the welfare of the native group.

(3) The price paid for technological advances, in terms of sacrifice and suffering, should be considered as a separate problem, and its psychological significance should be seriously investigated.

MASS MEDIA OF COMMUNICATION[1]

KN 20

The communication system of any country is an integral part of that country's culture and society, and should be understood and evaluated in that context. The part played by mass communication media in the Soviet Union differs in several important characteristics from that of the western press, radio, and film. First, all mass media in the USSR are controlled by the central authorities. Secondly, they are used by the authorities as tools which complement and reinforce each other in the achievement of ideologically grounded goals; they form a true system of "mass persuasion." Thirdly, certain physical and technological conditions have called for solutions which differ from western practices. And finally, news is presented in a manner consonant with the over-all goals; entertainment is secondary to the education of the public.

The Press

KN 209 665 208

The press in the Soviet Union is viewed as a major social force that must be harnessed and adapted to facilitate attainment of the society's defined goals. And since the Communist Party determines the goals of Soviet society, the Party controls the press. The press is expected to operate according to the principle of partiinost'—militant loyalty to the Party. In this sense Stalin has spoken of the press as a transmission belt between the masses and the Party.[2] (However, studies by the Russian Research Center at Harvard indicate that the role of the press was overestimated by Stalin.)

It is not surprising, therefore, that the press is given the assignment of eradicating from the minds of the people ideas of capitalism,

[1] This section is based largely on Inkeles (68), 1950.
[2] Ibid., pp. 135-136.

Appendix A

PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH[1]

The Bureau of Social Science Research, in agreeing to compose a background report on the Kazakhs for the Human Resources Research Office, regarded the report as a pilot study. The participants in the project had no guidelines other than broadly conceived research techniques such as are generally used in Soviet studies. The application of the results to the purposes of psychological warfare was in fact worked out in the course of the study. The Kazakhs presented additional difficulties because less is known in the United States about them than about, say, the Ukrainians, the Great-Russians, or other nationalities of the European parts of the Soviet Union. An interdisciplinary team was put together to meet these problems. 121

The primary function of the study was to provide a rounded picture of the Kazakhs and of the changes they were undergoing under the Soviets. Since these people live in an area ordinarily inaccessible, problems in information gathering had to be solved, as well as the more usual problems concerning interpretation and evaluation of data. The source materials to be drawn upon were scattered and had never previously been surveyed. The problem of sources will be described in the last part of this methodological survey, for it is a matter closely connected to the nature of the report and bears upon its value.

It is generally agreed that Soviet information may be used to compose a picture of life in the Soviet Union. Where Soviet information is not propaganda it is as reliable as similar information anywhere else, and where it is propaganda it is readily identifiable as such. The quantitative information is not as complete as it might be, but there is enough of it to permit evaluation and cross-checking. 127 121

The present statement on methods concerns itself with two problems: one, the contributions of various disciplines and their integration into a meaningful picture of Kazakh life; and the other, the sources of information, their scope and content.

DEMOGRAPHY

Attention had been drawn to the Kazakhs because of a striking demographic fact about them: They had suffered a severe population loss between 1926 and 1939. The techniques of demographic analysis would have been applied to them in any case but only as a secondary line of inquiry. In the Kazakh research, however, demography came to have a central place. This study had as its target the demarcation of vulnerabilities to psychological warfare, and common sense alone would suggest that a large population loss might well leave lasting vulnerabilities. 121 128 161

[1]By Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

128 The official Soviet explanation of the Kazakh population loss serves
161 to call attention to the problems of demographic method as applied in this case. The only known reference by the Soviets to the matter of Kazakh losses is related to the development of industry in Soviet Asia. The loss of Kazakhs is laid to the growth of industry in areas neighboring on Kazakhstan, primarily the growth of industrial towns and cities in the southern Urals (Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk) and in southern Siberia (Novosibirsk, the Kuzbass, etc.). This statement implies a movement of Kazakhs from their native steppes to the cities to join in industry, thereby giving up their Kazakhdom. By shifting from the steppes to the factories and mines they became Russified and were, so the implication runs, listed as Russians in the 1939 census.

This simple explanation of a seemingly complex matter immediately arouses suspicion. The official Soviet explanation addresses itself only to the growth of industry, which is a positive merit in the Soviet scheme. Hence, one wonders whether a negative fact, a possible source of embarrassment to the Soviet propagandist, is being counterbalanced by a positive fact, the growth of industry.

Investigation of the population loss revealed a complex problem which no single explanation could resolve. The Kazakhs numbered 3,968,289 in the census of December 1926, and 3,098,764 in the census of January 1939. The loss in the 13-year period was thus almost 900,000, or 22 per cent. This figure, moreover, refers only to the physical or absolute loss, and the problem is broader than that. The Kazakhs would have been reproducing themselves during that period. For an understanding of the dynamics of possible population growth, an insight may be gained from comparison with a neighboring people. The Kirgiz are Turks just as the Kazakhs are. The traditional occupation of both is the raising of herds; both are natives of Central Asia, and have been for many centuries. The Kirgiz, living under different conditions in the Soviet period, increased by some 16 per cent during the 1926-1939 period while the Kazakhs were decreasing. The Kirgiz rate of increase was about the average for the entire Soviet Union. With a similar population increase, there would have been 4,600,000 Kazakhs by 1939, instead of 3,100,000. Thus one is faced with a projected loss of about 1,500,000. It is this projected population figure which we must deal with, rather than the actual. Of this, no mention is made in the Soviet literature.

129 A fuller understanding of the Kazakh population loss was gained by an intensive examination of Kazakh history, especially in the 19th century. In the light of their past record, the reactions of the Kazakhs to the process of Sovietization became comprehensible. In this process the Kazakhs, traditionally herdsmen, were forced into collective farms and were required to perform tasks contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The population loss was traced to resistance to collectivization, with attendant mass arrests, flight across the borders, mass starvation, and death; to poor organization of collectives; and finally, to industrialization and Russification.

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

121 The interpretation of what Sovietization means involves a broader
177 methodological problem than the Kazakh question alone. One of the writers of the report had advanced the theory that in Sovietizing a people, the leaders of the USSR were performing what may be referred to as controlled acculturation. Acculturation in anthropology refers to

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the changes in one group of people which result from their coming into contact with another. This has been covered generally in the anthropological literature. However, contact between peoples, or the establishment of some kind of relationship by government, trade, or religious conversion, usually has been a matter of progressive development, not one of systematic planning based on a detailed preconceived notion of the new form the changing society will assume. The new idea in the Soviet scheme was that of the uniform transformation of all minority peoples in the Soviet Union to the new way of life. The use of force in this context has two purposes; it is used to maintain control; at the same time it is used to bring about change and control the direction of change.

The acculturation process may be described in terms of accommodation and conflict. What institutions do the people undergoing change possess to meet the change readily and accept it? On the other hand, what institutions do they have to oppose the change, to block off the culture contact? A balance sheet of the potential sources of accommodation and of conflict can be drawn up.

An example of this procedure may be taken from the process of forced collectivization of the Kazakhs. Herdsmen by tradition, the Kazakhs regard farming as a task for women and for those too poor to maintain themselves by herding. When the Soviets forced them to settle down on farms in the early 1930's, the Kazakhs resisted strongly. Their reactions might be compared to those of an American told to do something which questioned at once his manhood and his ability to support his family. But the response of the Kazakhs would be even stronger, because traditionally they have maintained a sharp separation between tasks which men perform, such as care of the herds, and tasks which women perform, such as farming. Further intensifying the response was the contempt of the Kazakh herdsman for the farmer.

The Soviet plan to settle the Kazakhs down on farms was motivated partly by economic considerations—to get the Kazakhs to raise farm produce in addition to herd produce. There was also a political factor; it is easier to control a population that is fixed in a definite place, as farmers are, than a group of nomads who might be anywhere within an area of a thousand square miles with their herds. But traditional Kazakh patterns of culture opposed and blocked Sovietization, partly due to the feelings of the people, partly due to their institutions.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the Kazakh way of life helped along the process of Sovietization. When the collective farms were set up, groups of Kazakhs who were blood kin were moved into them. The Kazakhs have traditionally lived and worked together in groups composed of such blood kin. Today, the typical collective farm is composed of closely related families, all descended from a common ancestor, who have been living in close contact with each other for hundreds of years. The Soviets, far from breaking up these groups, simply moved them bodily into the new farms. Thus there existed certain institutions which accommodated to and were readily adopted by the Soviet order.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

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Anyone engaged in Soviet studies faces the constant problem of the changing historical record: History is at times rewritten by Soviet writers. The comparison of the new version with the old presents two aspects. The first concerns the facts themselves: How have they been changed, that is, what facts have been suppressed and what new facts have now been made available? The second is a matter of the